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Roma are mainly located in South Eastern Europe and with a population of
approximately 6 million people they constitute the largest ethnic minority in
the continent (Open Society Institute, 2008).1 They experience severe social
exclusion in terms of high poverty and unemployment levels, low educational
attainments and no participation in the political and cultural life. Roma
people are poorer than other population groups and more likely to fall into
poverty and remain poor. They have persistent disadvantages in education,
including low school attendance and overrepresentation in special schools
and schools for adult education.2 Roma are often employed in low skilled
jobs where they earn below average wages. They often lack access to credit
and property ownership and are overdependent on social benefits.
The problems of the Roma minority have become evident with the ex-
pansion of the European Union. The visa liberalisation and the adhesion
to the Union of countries like Romania and Bulgaria - where the percent-
age of Roma population is high - have indirectly led to migration flows to-
wards Western Europe. The receiving countries encountered new problems:
increased number of asylum requests, appearance of informal settlements,
increased number of unemployed and inadequacy of the education system to
accommodate new foreign pupils. The extraordinariness of the phenomenon
led to hot discussions within the European countries and civil society. It
increased the interest of the EU in the EU candidate countries with a high
percentage of Roma population, e.g. Serbia. Understanding the impact of
programmes targeting Roma is useful not only for the sending countries, but
also for the receiving ones.
Schooling has always been considered a needed measure to improve living
conditions of Roma people and to foster their integration: higher enrolment
rates and better achievement at school are expected to lead to persistent
effects in the labour market and in the reduction of poverty in the long-run.
The goal of this paper is to evaluate the impact of the main programme
targeting Roma inclusion in education in South Eastern Europe in the first
year of its introduction: the Roma Teaching Assistant Programme (RTA).3
1The number of Roma and the subsequent numbers refer to the following countries:
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Roma-
nia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine.
2The net enrolment rate of Roma in primary education varies among the countries and
it is still low, in the range of 40% to 60%. Moreover, students may enrol at the beginning
of the year, but may not actually attend school: the percentage of completion rates of
primary school is in the range of only 30% to 40% in most countries in 2008 (Open Society
Institute, 2008). Special schools are schools for children with special educational needs.
Schools for adult education were initially introduced with the idea to provide basic literacy
knowledge to adult pupils. Nowadays, however, they are mainly attended by pupils who
enrolled at school late and by pupils who decided to return to school after dropping out.
3The Serbian name of the programme is Romski Asistenti - Pomoc´ u Nastavi. The Ser-
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Roma assistants - one per each school - participate in regular lessons where
they provide additional help to Roma pupils who have difficulties in following
classes. They organise additional lessons, help them with their homework
and assignments and once per week they visit their parents. We examine if
this remedial education programme reduces dropouts, raises attendance and
improves the marks of Roma pupils. This study uses primary collected data
during 5 months in the Summer-Autumn 2010. We employ two different
econometric strategies and their combination. First, we exploit the gradual
implementation and the intensity of the programme in order to base the
evaluation of its impact on a comparison of Early and Late Enrollees. Sec-
ond, we compare children exposed to the programme to older cohorts less
exposed to it. There is evidence that all children exposed to the programme
went on average more to school. We also find evidence that marks improved
in mathematics and Serbian for first graders. Higher impacts are obtained
in schools with a lower number of Roma: the higher is their number, the
lower the impact of the programme on the outcomes of interest. This is
especially the case for girls, for whom being in a school with a lower number
of Roma turns out to be more favourable. Boys respond to the programme
with fewer absences in schools with fewer Roma.
Two main mechanisms may help to explain the empirical evidence. First,
the intervention alters the inputs in the education production function by
providing more instruction time to pupils. The second potential mechanism
works through cultural transmission of preferences for education. For an
ethnic group which has extremely low educational outcomes in different
countries, it is possible that this fact can be, at least partly, explained by
preferences for education. In the case of RTA, the provision of a role model, a
person with the same Roma background, can affect preferences for education
of both children and parents and induce children to reduce absences and
exert more effort at school.
There are no studies in economic literature that investigate how to im-
prove life circumstances of Roma, in general, and Roma kids, in particular.
This paper contributes to the existing literature by providing an accurate
overview of the attainments of Roma pupils in Serbian schools, for which
so far there were no data available, and by contrasting their achievement
to the average Non Roma pupils. More importantly, it adds evidence on
short-term effects of remedial education targeting a stigmatised minority
group and suggests replicable examples in contexts where minorities suffer
bian Government - together with Montenegro, Croatia, Macedonia, Hungary, Romania,
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia - is participating in the Decade of Roma Inclu-
sion, an international initiative running from 2005 to 2015 in Central and South-Eastern
Europe. The initiative brings together governments, international and non-governmental
organizations to improve the welfare of the Roma population, focusing on healthcare, ed-
ucation, employment and housing. Examples of other programmes which introduce Roma
school assistants can be found in Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Croatia.
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low attainment rates and social exclusion. For Roma people this is the case
in many other European countries.
Related Literature This paper adds to the literature on remedial educa-
tion programmes. Policies targeting low-performing students are generally
difficult to evaluate because children with learning difficulties are not ran-
domly assigned to programmes. Their characteristics affect both the selec-
tion into the programme and its success, making it difficult to distinguish
between the two effects, especially because the selection mechanism is not
typically fully observable. A few studies are able to overcome the iden-
tification problem and they find support for the effectiveness of remedial
education in the short run.4 Aside from short term-effects, there are two
very important questions for policy makers. Does the effect fade out after
the programme? Is the effect of remedial education cumulative? Banerjee
et al (2007) find that only a year after the end of a remedial education pro-
gramme, its effect faded largely out. In contrast, children participating in
the programme for two consecutive years, could accumulate knowledge and
increased their test scores in both years. This suggests that gaps can be
reduced, but policy makers should aim at long-term interventions.
This study speaks also to the literature on programmes aiming at im-
proving schooling outcomes of minority communities and at narrowing dif-
ferences between racial groups. The black-white achievement gap and its
evolution has been intensively investigated in the United States.5 Fryer
(2010) demonstrates that today’s racial differences in social and economic
outcomes are greatly reduced when one accounts for educational achieve-
4See for instance Lavy and Schlosser (2005); Jacob and Lefgren (2004); Hanushek,
Kain, and Rivkin (2002); Banerjee, Cole, Duflo, and Linden (2007).
5The first and most known programme attempting to close the racial gap is the Perry
Preschool programme introduced in 1962: it targeted children from disadvantaged socio-
economic backgrounds and consisted of a 2-5-hour daily preschool programme for children
aged three years old and weekly home visits by teachers. Schweinhart, Barnes, and Weikart
(1993) find that students in the programme had higher marks between the ages of 5 to
27, 21% less grade retention or special services required and 21% higher graduation rates.
Other interventions for disadvantaged families followed such as the Abecedarian Project
in the ’70s, which provided childcare services for four cohorts of children from infancy
through age five, and the Early Training Project, consisting in summertime experiences
and weekly home visits during the three summers before entering first grade. Attempts
have been also made during the primary school through the introduction of after-school
programmes (Lauer, Akiba, Wilkerson, Apthorp, Snow, and Martin-Glenn, 2006), merit
pay for principals, teachers, and students (Podgursky and Springer, 2007; Fryer, 2010),
professional development for teachers (Boyd, Grossman, Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff,
2009), and getting parents to be more involved (Domina, 2005), placing disadvantaged
students in better schools through desegregation busing (Angrist and Lang, 2004) or al-
tering the neighborhoods in which they live (Jacob, 2004; Sanbonmatsu, Kling, Duncan,
and Brooks-Gunn, 2006). The evidence on the efficacy of these interventions is mixed:
certain programmes have left the racial achievement gap essentially unchanged. A good
overview of the evolution of the black-white gap is given in Neal (2006).
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ment and poverty levels. This points to the fact that there is little empirical
evidence for discrimination in the recent data. A similar finding emerges in
the study of Kertesi and Kezdi (2011) on Roma educational achievement in
Hungary. They find that the gap between Roma and Non Roma is substan-
tially larger than the gap between African Americans and whites in United
States, but that accounting for health, parenting, school and class fixed ef-
fects, and family background, the achievement gap disappears in reading
and decreases by 85% in mathematics.
The third relevant strand of the literature is on programmes aiming at
achieving better schooling outcomes of the poor. Recent intervention tar-
geting children with low socio-economic background have tried to affect the
demand for education. A prominent type of demand side programmes are
conditional cash transfers which raised enrolment and attendance in many
developing countries. However, policies that promote school enrolment may
not promote learning: early contributions indicate that programmes which
are effective at reducing absence from school often do not have an impact
on achievements of the average student (Schultz, 2004; Miguel and Kremer,
2004). Analogously, Fryer (2011a), through school-based randomized trials
in schools designed to test the impact of incentives on student achievement,
shows that incentives can raise achievement among even the poorest mi-
nority students in the lowest performing schools only if the incentives are
given for certain inputs, such as reading books. Providing incentives for
achievement in marks is much less effective. Finally, only providing school
books and other school material or subsidised school meals does not seem to
improve students achievements in the case of students with weaker academic
backgrounds (Glewwe, Kremer, and Moulin, 2009; Vermeersch and Kremer,
2005).
The rest of the paper is organised as follow. Section 2 summarises the
Roma Teaching Assistant Programme and describes our data. Sections 3
explains our empirical strategy and presents our results. Section 4 discusses
the findings and concludes.
2 Description of the programme and preliminary
analysis
2.1 The Roma Teaching Assistant Programme
The Roma Teaching Assistant Programme started as a pilot programme
implemented by various NGOs in 2002. In 2007 the OSCE took over its co-
ordination and financing. In 2009 the programme started to have a country
wide coverage and it is under the coordination of the Ministry of Education.
In the scholastic year 2009/2010 48 primary schools had a Roma assistant:
22 schools started with the programme at different points of time between
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2002 and 2007; 26 schools started in 2009. The Ministry expanded the
programme to other 77 schools starting from November 2010.
Based on when the programme started in a school, the schools can be
divided in two groups: schools entering the programme in September 2009
(Early Enrollees) and schools entering the programme in September 2010
(Late Enrollees). The 22 schools, which joined the programme between 2002
and 2007, are excluded from our analysis. The selection of these schools was
not centralised; they were chosen by NGOs based on the share of Roma
pupils. For our analysis we will consider only 26 Early Enrollees and 77
Late Enrollees.
Both schools and potential Roma assistants had to apply to participate in
the programme. Among 78 schools that applied in 2009, a commission rep-
resenting the government institutions together with OSCE representatives,
chose 26 Early Enrollee schools based on the percentage of Roma students
(between 5% and 40%) and preferably, the availability of preschool pro-
gramme in the school.6 The requirements for Roma assistants were knowl-
edge of Romani, secondary school diploma and experience in working with
children. 158 candidates applied for 26 assistant positions.7 In 2010 the
programme was renamed to Education for all and starting with the scholas-
tic year 2010/2011 Roma teaching assistants were renamed to pedagogical
assistants. In year 2010, 252 schools applied for 77 assistants. Similar to the
first round, schools were eligible only if they had between 5% and 40% of
Roma. The only difference between the two rounds was that in the second
round the availability of a preschool programme was not considered. The
reason is that in 2010/2011 pedagogical assistants started to work in 50
kindergartens offering compulsory preschool programme. Schools not offer-
ing the preschool programme could have then been close to kindergartens
offering it. The Roma pupil would have been helped by an assistant from
her entry in the school anyhow. One could argue that this small change in
requirements could lead to a selection bias in the two rounds, but our data
do not support this claim.8 Selection criteria for now pedagogical assistants
remained unchanged and out of the 329 applications for the position, 77 were
664 out of 78 schools that applied had a percentage of Roma between 5% and 40%.
Among these 64, OSCE selected 19 schools (out of 26) with a preschool programme, 5
schools (out of 36) with no preschool programme and 2 schools (out of 2) for which no
information is available.
7The following criteria were taken into account for the ranking of the assistants’ appli-
cations: highest level of education completed or enrolled (from 10 to 30 points), experience
in working with Roma children (0 to 10 points), experience in working on projects related
to education (0 to 10 points), motivation (0 to 10 points), attendance of relevant seminars
and/or courses (0 to 10 points), experience as Roma teaching assistant (0 to 10 points),
knowledge of Romani (0 to 10 points) and additional points (0 to 10 points).
8Unfortunately we do not have information on the availability of a preschool programme
for schools applying in 2010/2011. Nonetheless, it is worthy to recall that some schools
without the compulsory preschool programme have also been selected in the previous year.
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accepted to work at schools and another 50 were accepted for kindergartens.
Schools got to know that they would receive an assistant in early June.
They did not inform parents about the presence of the RTAs. The pro-
gramme did not receive publicity from TV and radio. This leads us to
believe that parents were not aware of the existence of the RTA before en-
rolling their children at school. Data also confirm that Early Enrollees did
not attract more Roma students than Late Enrollees in the first year of the
programme.9 There is not selection of children into schools.
Every school received only one assistant. Schools received from the Min-
istry a description of her duties, but they were free to decide how to allocate
the time of the assistant depending on the needs of the school.10 Activities
at school involve both working during regular classes and after-school work.
Work with local communities comprises duties such as collecting information
about children who did not enrol or who left school, gathering documents
for school enrolment, visiting families,11 cooperation with Roma NGOs, etc.
The assistants were advised to work mainly with lower grades, especially the
first. Their objectives were to ensure that children go to school, to prevent
them from dropping out and to help them to succeed at school. In 2009
the Ministry of Education organised a series of seminars with the goal of
providing the necessary knowledge and skills to Roma teaching assistants.12
2.2 Preliminary Analysis
2.2.1 Data and Trends of the Variables
We use primary data collected during 5 months in the summer/autumn 2010.
School data was not available in a digital format and we visited schools and
collected in person data from administrative records. Our dataset contains
information on 23 schools (out of 26) among Early Enrollees and 15 schools
(out of 77) among Late Enrollees.13 Given that the data collection process
9Roma pupils joining Early Enrollees schools in the pretreatment year - 2008/2009
- corresponded to 2.4% of all Roma enrolled in these schools. In Late Enrollees they
were 2.1%. In the first year of the programme - 2009/2010 - these percentages were 1.6%
and 1.3%. The number of Roma pupils enrolling at school for the first time reduced
proportionally between the two years in both types of schools.
10There was a suggested time allocation. The 30 weekly hours of the assistant could be
distributed in the following way: work at school (19 hours), work with the local community
(8 hours) and writing reports and documentation (3 hours).
11In most cases Roma live in segregated settlements so that assistants can go to the
settlement and visit several families at once.
12In total, the assistants attended 22 working days of seminars and courses in the
scholastic year 2009/2010. Regular seminars provided the opportunity to the Ministry to
understand the problems of the assistants and guide them through the initial difficulties.
In 2010/2011 a set of 9 modules, which all assistants had to attend in their first year of
service, was devised.
13In total, there were 26 schools which got an assistant in 2009/2010. In 3 schools we
were not allowed to collect data. These schools do not differ from the other schools either
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was costly, our dataset consists only of a subsample of Late Enrollees. We
selected 15 Late Enrollees schools according to the following criteria: first,
they had to be in the same district of an Early Enrollees school;14 second,
they had to be in a rural/urban municipality as the nearby Early Enrollees
school; third, they had to share a similar school size to the nearby Early
Enrollees school and finally, a similar percentage of Roma pupils.15
Schools are mainly in Belgrade/Central Serbia and in the South/South-
Eastern part of the country, and they are equally distributed in rural and
urban areas.16 Figure 1 reports the distribution of schools in our sample.
The data set contains information on 4 scholastic years − from 2006/2007
to 2009/2010 − for the lower four grades of primary school for 18,268 Roma
and Non Roma children. It contains for each year and for each pupil the
final mark in mathematics, final mark in Serbian and number of hours of
absences in a year. The data set contains individual characteristics, such as
gender, year of birth, month of birth and place of birth.17 School specific
data include school size, number of Roma - in both school and class - and
whether the school is in an urban setting.
Roma children Table 1 shows summary statistics of the control variables
and main outcomes of interest for Roma children in the pre- and treatment
year. In the pre-treatment year the mean characteristics of the schools that
were enrolled in the programme later (column (2), table 1) resemble those
of the schools that enrolled first (column (1), table 1). Boys and girls are
equally distributed in both groups of schools and pupils were mainly born
in the same town where they attend school. A fifth of all students in the
schools are Roma. The number of Roma per class is roughly 4-5 children and
the class size is 22.161 in Early Enrollees and 23.966 in Late Enrollees. The
table shows no statistically significant differences between Early Enrollees
and Late Enrollees nor in the student’s and school characteristics nor in
the outcomes of interest. This similarity between Early Enrollees and Late
in the number of pupils or in the percentage of Roma children and they are located in
different areas: one in Belgrade, one in Central Serbia and one in the South.
14A district is made up by more municipalities. In Serbia there are 24 districts and 160
municipalities.
15In few cases the school chosen was not available and we needed to select the second
option.
1610 schools are located in Belgrade; 8 schools in the central area of the country (5
schools in the municipality of Valjevo and 3 in the municipality of Novi Sad); 12 schools
in South-Eastern Serbia (3 schools in the municipality of Jagodina, 2 in Kragujevac, 3
in Krusˇevac, 3 in Zajecˇar and 1 in Pozˇarevac); 8 schools in the South of the country (6
schools in the municipality of Leskovac and 2 in the municipality of Niˇs). We define urban
area a municipality with more than 35,000 inhabitants.
17Roma in Serbia are mainly sedentary: they do not move much within the country.
Nonetheless, there is a substantial out-migration, especially towards the European Union,
and in the last years in-migration has increased due to the wars in Ex-Yugoslavia. Many
Roma refugees in Serbia come from Kosovo.
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Enrollees schools is also found in the treatment year, providing support for
our claim that Early Enrollees and Late Enrollees are comparable.18
By simply comparing average outcomes in the two types of schools, we
see that dropouts almost double in the last year in both types of school and
absences increase in 2009/2010 in both Early Enrollees and Late Enrollees,
but they increase by less in Early Enrollee schools. We believe that both
the increase in dropouts and the increases in absences is related to the
liberalisation of the visa regime with the European Union. This regime
change induced a considerable number of Roma families to migrate to the
EU. Finally, we see a minor improvement in all marks from pre- to treatment
year. This effect is larger in Early Enrollees than in Late Enrollees.
Non Roma children In our analysis we focus on Roma children and we
use for all of our estimations only the sample of Roma children.19 Table
2 shows summary statistics of the control variables and main outcomes of
interest for Non Roma children in the pre- and treatment year. No statisti-
cally significant differences are found neither in the pre- nor in the treatment
year in the pupils’ characteristics or outcomes. The only statistically signif-
icant difference is in the dropout rate, which however is close to zero and
not problematic in the lower primary school grades.
The differences between Roma and Non Roma children are striking.
Three important aspects need to be stressed when comparing them. First,
dropouts are almost exclusively of Roma children. Moreover, Roma chil-
dren are absent from school approximately three to four times more than
Non Roma children. Lastly, on a grading scale of 1 to 5, the difference
of almost two marks between Roma and Non Roma pupils in Serbian and
mathematics is substantial.
3 Econometric Strategy
We want to examine the impact of the Roma Teaching Assistant Programme
on dropouts, attendance and marks of Roma pupils in the first year of its
implementation. In the analysis we use only Roma children. We exploit
the gradual implementation of the programme. Our treatment group con-
sists of schools which started to implement the programme in September
2009 (Early Enrollees), whereas the control group is a subsample of schools
which got the assistants starting from November 2010 (Late Enrollees).We
argue that the selection of schools to enter the programme earlier/later can
be treated “as if random” for several reasons. First, the selection criteria
18The only significant difference is found for the place of birth: there are less migrant
children in treated schools.
19The only exception is section on spillover effects in the appendix.
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remained almost the same in both rounds.20 Second, one could argue that
schools applying in the first round were more motivated, but schools which
applied in the first year could also apply in the second year. However, some
schools which applied in 2009 did not apply anymore in the year after.21
Thus, if they really were more motivated and of better quality, it is hard
to understand why they did not want to be part of the programme any-
more in 2010. Third, we do know that observable characteristics do not
differ between schools applying in the first year and schools applying in the
second year.22 Fourth, we are in possession of data for 3 years prior to the
introduction of the programme and the placebo tests for these years support
our claim of no systematic differences between the two groups of schools.
Fifth, we do know that the committee for schools selection - composed of
the Minister of Education and other representatives of the Ministry, repre-
sentatives of National Council, OSCE and of the Ministry for Human and
Minority Rights - rated schools based on their shown interest and motivation
(application) in the same way, in both years.23
A second possible estimation strategy is to exploit the fact that older
cohorts were less exposed to the programme (control group) to younger
cohorts (treated group) in Early Enrollees-treated schools.24
The main advantage of using as a control group schools which enrolled
later in the programme is that its impact would not be confounded with
other government policies that took place in the year of its introduction. For
instance, in 2009/2010 all first grade pupils got free text books and in the last
few years the Ministry strongly suggests to schools to reduce repetition rates
especially in the lower grades. The weakness of this control group is that we
cannot be completely certain that unobservable characteristics are the same
in Early Enrollee and Late Enrollee schools. In order to purge time-invariant
school characteristics, we can use older cohorts in the treatment schools as
a control group. Nonetheless, this econometric strategy relies on the strong
assumptions that there were no government interventions over the period -
which is not exactly our case - and that the outcomes have a regular trend
20In both rounds the programme was advertised in newspapers Politika and Prosvetni
Pregled, the last being a newspaper for people working in the education sector; in ad-
dition to the advertisement, in 2010/2011 schools’ directorates - one directorate may be
responsible for more than a municipality - informed schools directly.
2147% of schools which applied in 2009, and did not get selected, did it again in 2010
and two thirds of them got selected in the second year (16 out of 26 schools applying in
both years). Among these schools, only 2 schools, corresponding to 12.5%, is present in
our subsample.
22Schools which applied in 2010 are in the same areas of schools of 2009 and they have
almost the same percentage of Roma, on average 13.99% compared to 13.07%. They are
not statistically different (p-value=0.458). These are the only information we have on
schools which applied and did not get selected.
23In both rounds the committee gave priority to schools in the poorest municipalities
or with huge Roma settlements (Subotica, Novi Sad, Niˇs, Kragujevac, Belgrade).
24This method is similar in spirit to Duflo (2004).
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over the years. By combining the Early - Late Enrollees analysis with the
cohort specification we better take into account strengths and weaknesses
of both approaches.
3.1 First Approach: Comparison of Early Enrollees vs. Late
Enrollees
Our first econometric strategy exploits the fact that some schools received
the assistants prior to other schools. We compare Early Enrollee schools
with Late Enrollee schools in the years 2008/2009 - year before the intro-
duction of the programme - and 2009/2010 - year of the introduction of the
programme.
3.1.1 Average treatment approach
Our specification (1) is a difference-in-difference model with school fixed
effects:
Yijt = β0 + δt + ρj + β1treatmentj ∗ postt + β2X ′ijt + εijt (1)
The outcome variables Yijt are dropout, hours of absences and final
marks in Serbian and mathematics of individual i, in school j at time t. δt is a
time fixed effect, ρj corresponds to school fixed effects, and treatmentj∗postt
is the interaction term between the dummies for treatment status of the
school and treatment year. Dropout is a dummy variable taking value one
if child i dropped out of school during year t, otherwise it is equal to zero.
With school fixed effects we are able to control for time-invariant unobserv-
able school characteristics as well as unobservable geographical characteris-
tics. The control variables X ′ijt are school size, school size squared, number
of Roma in school, number of Roma in school squared, percentage of Roma
per class, class size, class size squared, the gender of the child (=1 if the child
is female), age, age squared, and whether the kid is a migrant (=1 if the
child was born in the same town where she attends school). The coefficient
of interest (β1) is the difference-in-difference estimator of the interaction
term between treatment and time that captures the difference in outcomes
between the treatment and control schools.
Results for the different outcomes of interest are reported in table 3. For
all outcomes we estimate the regressions without and with controls (columns
(1) and (2)). We then split our sample by gender (columns (3) and (4)) to
assess whether the impact of the intervention differs by gender.25
25There is vast evidence on gender gaps in education and their underlying causes. Buch-
mann, DiPrete, and McDaniel (2008) give a very good review of the literature. For this
reason we also control for the gender of the assistant, but it does not turn out to be
significant in any specification.
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Overall, results show that the programme had a statistically significant
impact only on hours of absences: pupils exposed to the programme were
on average almost 17 hours less absent from school (0.121 standard devia-
tions).26 This is especially the case for male, whose reduction in absences
is of roughly 26 hours (5 days) or equivalently 0.176 standard deviations.
Dropouts and marks in both subjects are unaffected by the programme.
At first it could seem surprising that dropouts do not respond to the pro-
gramme, but our preliminary data analysis has shown that dropouts are not
problematic in the lower 4 grades. The fact that the inclusion of control
variables does not change the magnitude of our coefficients suggests that
our coefficients are very robustly estimated.
There are only three settlements where children from both control and
treatment schools live together and it is possible that in these settlements
children in Early Enrollee and children in Late Enrollees schools interact.
If one were to believe that there were spillover effects from treated children
on children from control schools, this would imply that coefficients in our
regressions are underestimated.
Placebo Regressions The difference-in-difference approach relies on the
parallel trends assumption. We assume that, in the absence of the pro-
gramme, treatment and comparison schools would have had a parallel trend
in the average outcomes of interest. An obvious way to examine the robust-
ness of our results is to estimate the same regressions (specification (1)) for
the years 2006/2007 versus 2007/2008 and for the years 2007/2008 versus
2008/2009. By estimating the same regressions for pretreatment years, we
can test if the outcomes in the two groups of schools were regular before
the introduction of the programme. Significant difference-in-difference coef-
ficients in placebo regressions would invalidate our estimation strategy and
would question the adequacy of our comparison group.
Placebo tests are summarised in table 4 and we do not find significant
coefficients. The diff-in-diff estimates for mathematics and Serbian are in-
significant and negative for the period immediately preceding the introduc-
tion of the programme (2007/2008 versus 2008/2009). Even if one were to
believe that there was a trend prior to the programme, then our estimates
for all outcomes are underestimating the effect of the programme in the
average treatment approach.27 The placebo regressions support our claim
that Late Enrollees are a good counterfactual for Early Enrollees.
26On average, Roma pupils are absent from school 143 hours (28 days) in a year.
27Remember that we expect the coefficient of treatment*post in our main regression to
be positive for marks (Serbian and mathematics).
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3.1.2 Intensity of treatment approach
The design of the intervention permits us to investigate whether the effect
of the programme varies with the number of Roma per school. Each school
has only one assistant: the higher the number of Roma per school, the less
intense is the programme. If the assistant has to help a high number of
students, she will help less each of them: she will be less present both in
regular classes and in activities regarding their homework and assignments.
Our intensity specification is a variation of the previous approach; it still
uses within school variation of Roma, but now we exploit also the variation
in the number of Roma between schools. We divide schools in two equally
sized groups with 19 schools.28 The dummy intensive is equal to one for
schools with fewer than 43 Roma.29 The main difference to the prior model
is that we interact the dummy intensive with treatment and time. We
believe that differentiating the schools in groups helps to better understand
the role of the number of Roma on the impact of the programme. The
coefficient of interest is now β6.
The intensity of treatment is modeled:
Yijt = β0 + δt + β1treatmentj + β2treatmentj ∗ postt + β3intensive Romajt+
(2)
+ β4intensive Romajt ∗ postt + β5intensive Romajt ∗ treatmentj+
+ β6intensive Romajt ∗ treatmentj ∗ postt + εijt
Results with and without controls, and for both genders are reported in
table 5. The intensity of the programme clearly plays a role in explaining
its effects. The lower is the number of Roma in a school, and similarly the
more the assistant can help them, the higher is the impact on the outcomes
of interest. Absences, for instance, reduce on average by roughly 36 hours or
equivalently 0.228 standard deviations in a year in schools with less Roma,
compared to Late Enrollee schools. The fall in absences is driven by a re-
duction in absences of boys, almost 60 hours less. The effects disappear in
schools with a higher number of Roma. Marks in both mathematics and
Serbian increase for pupils in Early Enrollee schools with a lower number of
Roma, but again these effects do not result in schools with a higher number
of Roma. The impacts are especially large for females, for whom being in a
school with a lower number of Roma seems to be more favourable: on aver-
age, if exposed to the programme in a school with less Roma, their marks
28The average school number of Roma between the two years - pre- and treatment year
- is used to define the two groups. The threshold is here 43 pupils in a school. Our balance
tests for the pretreatment year are reported in the Appendix (table 10).
29In A.2 we vary the threshold and we find that the effect of the programme is stronger,
the lower the threshold. This is exactly what we would expect. Remember that this
approach delivers the effect of the programme on schools for which we define, based on
the threshold, that the programme is intensive. A lower threshold means that less Roma
are in that school and for this reason the programme is more effective.
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in mathematics and Serbian increase by 0.680 (0.581 standard deviations)
and 0.499 (0.419 standard deviations). The improvement in test scores is
larger in mathematics than in languages and this different response to in-
terventions by subject has been found also in other studies (Fryer, 2011b).
Possible explanations for the disparity in treatment effects by subject area
are offered in Fryer (2011b). One theory suggests that language skills de-
velopment occurs at an earlier age than the development of higher cognitive
skills. Another prominent theory suggests that language acquisition and
reading test scores are influenced by factors outside of the classroom. This
is plausible because language skills are used more outside of the classroom
than mathematics skills.30
Placebo Regressions We estimate placebo regressions of estimation (2)
for the years 2006/2007 versus 2007/2008 and for the years 2007/2008 ver-
sus 2008/2009. Placebo tests are summarised in table 6. The coefficients
for school grades are positive, but not significant for the period preceding
the programme (2007/2008 versus 2008/2009). The coefficients we obtain
for the treatment year are much larger than coefficients from our placebo
regressions. For instance, in mathematics (Serbian) we obtain an increase
of 0.417 (0.307) in marks in treatment year, and this number is only -0.011
(0.113) for the pretreatment placebo regression. Similarly, for absences the
coefficient is negative, but with -7.490 hours much smaller than the coef-
ficient -36.390 from the main regression. Again, the placebo regressions
confirm that Late Enrollees are a good counterfactual for Early Enrollees.
3.2 Second approach: Cohort regressions and triple differ-
ence
We know that assistants worked mostly with the first grade31 and in the
second approach we compare kids in the first grade (young cohorts) with
kids in older grades - second, third and fourth - (old cohorts) in the pre-
and treatment year in treated schools. Here we assume that the difference
in marks between first graders’ and second, third and fourth graders’ would
have been constant over time, in the absence of the programme. We also
implicitly assume the absence of policies targeting specific grades. With this
econometrics strategy, we are able to purge time-invariant school character-
istics.
The specification in this section informs us whether the programme was
30For the corresponding references from the education literature see Fryer (2011b).
31We know this fact from informal discussions with assistants. We have also confirmed
this fact with survey data for Belgrade schools (only a subsample of schools) for which we
have collected additional data. In treated schools, the children with whom the assistant
actually worked were, on average, 9.73 years old, whereas children with whom the assistant
did not work, were 10.44 years old (Battaglia and Lebedinski, 2013).
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successful for the children enrolled in the first grade. We first estimate the
following regression for Early Enrollees:
Yijt = β0 + β1youngi + β2postt + β3youngi ∗ postt + εijt (3)
where Yijt are again dropout, hours of absences and final marks in Ser-
bian and mathematics of individual i, in school j and at time t ; youngt is
equal to 1 when the child is at the first grade; postt is equal to 1 in the year
of the treatment (2009/2010). The coefficient of interest is now β3 which
tells us how the first graders have performed compared to the older grades.
The same regression (3) is then estimated for Late Enrollees and the
triple difference between treated and control schools and cohorts is captured
by γ3 in the following specification:
Yijt = β0 + β1youngi + β2postt + β3youngi ∗ postt + γ1treatmentj ∗ postt +(4)
+γ2youngi ∗ treatmentj + γ3youngi ∗ postt ∗ treatmentj + εijt
Unlike estimation (3), regression (4) does not control for possible selec-
tion bias. By estimating cohort regressions on a pooled sample of Early
and Late Enrollees, we can control for government policies targeting specific
grades.32
The regressions are estimated with controls and we also inspect the im-
pacts by gender. Results are in table 7.
When comparing first graders with older pupils in only Early Enrollee
schools (column (1)), our coefficients of interest have, with the exception
of absences, the correct sign, but are not statistically significant. We are
not overly concerned that absences increase, because we observe a similar
pattern also in control schools (see column (2) in table 7). We believe that
the reason for the overall increase is that dropouts rise in 2009/2010 as a
consequence of visa liberalisation because some families have migrated to EU
countries.33 Results of the triple interaction for the full sample are reported
in column (3) in table 7. Dropouts are statistically significant. Absences
decrease for the young cohort, but they do not reach statistical significance.
Pupils exposed to the programme in the first grade get higher marks than
first graders in control schools (with respect to their older mates). This
effect is partly driven by the worse outcomes of first grade pupils in control
schools. We speculate that this happens, because first graders are overall
worse than first graders in the preceding year. On average, being in a Early
Enrollee school increases marks in mathematics and Serbian by 0.284 and
0.296 standard deviations for first graders.
32For instance, free schools books for first grade or lower repetition rates in general.
33Dropouts are included in our regressions and have a high number of absences.
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Placebo Regressions We test the robustness of our results by estimat-
ing placebo regressions (regression (3), (4)) for the years 2006/2007 versus
2007/2008 and for the years 2007/2008 versus 2008/2009 (see table 8). None
of the relevant coefficients is significant. The size of the coefficient for Ser-
bian for 2007/2008 versus 2008/2009 is insignificant, but not completely
negligible. Absences for the two placebo tests are positive, but we obtain
a reduction in absences for the treatment year. Similarly, the sign of the
coefficient suggests a worsening of marks for Serbian for younger cohorts,
exactly the opposite of what we find for the year of treatment.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we estimate the impact of the Roma Teaching Assistant Pro-
gramme in its first year of implementation on schooling outcomes. We use
a difference-in-difference approach by exploiting the gradual introduction
of the programme. We argue that the assignment to enter the programme
earlier/later can be treated as if random. As an additional check, we use
a second econometric strategy. We compare pupils of the first grade from
treated schools with older cohorts from the same schools. This econometric
strategy controls well for school specific characteristics, but we are not able
to control for government interventions over the observed period. We can
combine the two approaches (Early - Late Enrollees with cohort analysis)
and estimate the triple difference between young and old cohorts in treated
and control schools.
Results of our analysis show that the programme had a positive effect
and started to reduce the gap between Roma and Non Roma students both
in school achievements and attendance. There is evidence that absences
fell by 0.121 standard deviations in treated schools (17 hours, i.e. 3 to 4
days). The remedial education part of the programme targeted mainly first
graders. Our analysis suggests that, for this group, marks have improved
by almost 0.284 standard deviations in mathematics and 0.296 standard
deviations in Serbian. For the lower primary school grades, dropouts are
low in both Early and Late Enrollee and are not a major problem. Higher
impacts are obtained in schools with a lower number of Roma: the higher
is their number, the less the assistant can help them, and the lower is the
impact of the programme on the outcomes of interest in schools with fewer
Roma. Girls seem to benefit more from the programme in terms of better
marks, whereas boys exhibit lower absences. With our data it is not possible
to explain this differential impact of the programme. We do not know if
assistants worked more with girls (boys) or if girls (boys) responded better
to the programme in the case of marks (absences).
While first graders in treated schools perform better than their older
colleagues, overall the programme does not seem to have a significant im-
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pact on pupils’ achievement. This is likely the case because assistants work
mainly with lower grades and young cohorts are those really exposed to
them. Therefore, the general modest effects should not be interpreted as a
failure of the programme. Moreover, this study looks only at its impact in
the first year. It is possible that assistants and schools need some time to
adjust to the new role of the assistant and that the full benefit from them
will come at a later stage. This idea is also supported by the literature on
the importance of the experience of teachers which emphasises that gains in
teaching skills are largest in the initial years of teaching (Rivkin, Hanushek,
and Kain, 2005). Still, our results suggest that the programme is more ef-
fective in schools with less Roma. We are aware that it is possible that there
are systematic differences between schools with a lower and a higher share
of Roma. One could argue, for instance, that Roma in schools with a lower
share are more willing to adapt and assimilate to the majority population.
We cannot be certain that the same effects could be attained in schools with
higher percentage of Roma if more assistants were assigned to these schools.
It still seems plausible that if the goal of the policy maker is to close the
gap in schooling outcomes, then more Roma teaching assistants should be
assigned to schools with more Roma students.
We are not able to delve into the mechanism which drives our results and
our estimates are derived from reduced form regressions. Still, our results
could and probably are driven by two main mechanisms. First, the RTA
interventions alters the inputs of the education productions function. The
input of teaching is augmented and this can explain better marks of first
grade students. A second mechanism possibly at play is the cultural trans-
mission of preferences for education. The presence of a person coming from
the same Roma ethnic background could alter the preferences for education
and beliefs of Roma pupils, which induces them to attend more school and
to exert more effort at school.
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5 Tables
Table 1: Averages of control variables and outcomes in pre- and treatment
year: Roma
Pre-treatment year Treatment year
Early Late Early Late
Enrollees Enrollees Difference Enrollees Enrollees Difference
(1) (2) (3)[(1)-(2)] (4) (5) (6)[(4)-(5)]
Characteristics
Female 0.502 0.471 0.031 0.486 0.469 0.017
(0.023) (0.026)
Age 8.748 8.675 0.073 8.677 8.742 -0.065
(0.089) (0.110)
Born in the same town 0.867 0.814 0.053 0.877 0.807 0.070*
(0.038) (0.035)
Roma per school 0.223 0.193 0.030 0.235 0.194 0.041
(0.056) (0.057)
School size 304.937 361.506 -56.569 301.217 362.581 -61.364
(52.963) (56.046)
% of Roma per class 0.221 0.183 0.038 0.234 0.185 0.049
(0.056) (0.057)
Class size 22.161 23.966 -1.804 22.438 24.213 -1.775
(1.424) (1.381)
Outcomes
Dropouta 0.015 0.019 -0.004 0.026 0.035 -0.009
(0.006) (0.009)
Absences (hours) 118.103 125.378 -7.275 134.037 155.528 -21.491
(13.722) (16.808)
Serbianb 2.430 2.547 -0.117 2.496 2.568 -0.072
(0.123) (0.144)
Mathematicsb 2.284 2.370 -0.086 2.365 2.408 -0.043
(0.125) (0.156)
Number of schools 23 15 23 15
Number of Roma pupils 1241 811 1268 847
Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school level are reported in parentheses: * significant at
10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
a Dropout is equal to 1 if child dropped out of school during the year; otherwise 0.
b Marks range from 1 (worst) to 5 (best). They are categorical.
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Table 2: Averages of control variables and outcomes in pre- and treatment
year: Non Roma
Pre-treatment year Treatment year
Early Late Early Late
Enrollees Enrollees Difference Enrollees Enrollees Difference
(1) (2) (3)[(1)-(2)] (4) (5) (6)[(4)-(5)]
Characteristics
Female 0.487 0.477 0.010 0.469 0.486 -0.017
(0.014) (0.012)
Age 8.421 8.400 0.021 8.426 8.416 0.009
(0.066) (0.033)
Born in the same town 0.922 0.912 0.010 0.930 0.923 0.007
(0.011) (0.011)
Roma per school 0.223 0.193 0.030 0.235 0.194 0.041
(0.056) (0.057)
School size 304.937 361.506 -56.569 301.217 362.581 -61.364
(52.963) (56.046)
% of Roma per class 0.221 0.183 0.038 0.234 0.185 0.049
(0.056) (0.057)
Class size 22.161 23.966 -1.804 22.438 24.213 -1.775
(1.424) (1.381)
Outcomes
Dropouta 0.001 0.0006 0.0004 0.001 0.000 0.001**
(0.0006) (0.0005)
Absences (hours) 39.159 36.231 2.938 42.549 40.276 2.273
(2.535) (2.743)
Serbianb 4.396 4.328 0.068 4.434 4.339 0.094
(0.070) (0.072)
Mathematicsb 4.255 4.179 0.076 4.296 4.208 0.088
(0.080) (0.081)
Number of schools 23 15 23 15
Number of Non Roma pupils 4303 3374 4122 3514
Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school level are reported in parentheses: * significant at 10%,
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
a Dropout is equal to 1 if child dropped out of school during the year; otherwise 0.
b Marks range from 1 (worst) to 5 (best). They are categorical.
22
Table 3: Average treatment approach
Effect of programme in treatment year
all all female male
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dropouta
post 0.017** 0.015** 0.001 0.027**
(0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.012)
treatment*post -0.006 0.003 0.028* -0.018
(0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014)
No. observations 4167 4039 1951 2088
Absences
post 31.236*** 32.853*** 22.456*** 42.034***
(7.856) (9.078) (10.797) (10.764)
treatment*post -17.299** -16.679* -4.713 -26.119**
(7.856) (9.078) (10.797) (10.764)
No. observations 3980 3868 1871 1997
Serbianb
post 0.039 0.046 0.079 0.027
(0.060) (0.048) (0.055) (0.050)
treatment*post 0.044 0.012 -0.035 0.058
(0.069) (0.066) (0.075) (0.080)
Mathematicsb
post 0.051 0.065 0.096 0.041
(0.069) (0.062) (0.080) (0.056)
treatment*post 0.046 0.030 0.015 0.053
(0.081) (0.077) (0.091) (0.085)
No. observations 4085 3961 1916 2045
Controlsc No Yes Yes Yes
School FE No Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the effect of the programme on dropouts, absences and
Serbian and mathematics. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering
at the school level are reported in parentheses: * significant at 10%, **
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
a Dropout is equal to 1 if child dropped out of school during the year; otherwise
0.
b Marks range from 1 (worst) to 5 (best). They are categorical.
c Controls included are school size, school size squared, number of Roma in
school, number of Roma in school squared, percentage of Roma per class,
class size, class size squared, female (=1), age, age squared, and migrant
(=1).
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Table 4: Average treatment approach - Placebo
Placebo tests for pretreatment years
2006/2007 and 2007/2008 2007/2008 and 2008/2009
all female male all female male
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dropouta
treatment*post -0.003 0.006 -0.010 0.015 0.014 0.014
(0.009) (0.017) (0.016) (0.010) (0.025) (0.014)
No. observations 3640 1776 1864 3897 1897 2000
Absences
treatment*post 0.955 -2.002 3.566 9.558 2.921 14.935
(12.592) (17.435) (14.753) (13.864) (19.448) (10.602)
No. observations 3542 1732 1810 3788 1850 1938
Serbianb
treatment*post 0.059 0.141 -0.025 -0.094 -0.103 -0.053
(0.080) (0.105) (0.103) (0.077) (0.093) (0.072)
Mathematicsb
treatment*post 0.080 0.093 0.067 -0.057 -0.102 0.007
(0.066) (0.075) (0.080) (0.077) (0.098) (0.080)
No. observations 3585 1750 1835 3846 1876 1970
Controlsc Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the results of the placebo regressions for pretreatment years for the average
treatment approach. The outcomes of the regressions are dropouts, absences, Serbian and
mathematics. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school level are reported
in parentheses: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
a Dropout is equal to 1 if child dropped out of school during the year; otherwise 0.
b Marks range from 1 (worst) to 5 (best). They are categorical.
c Controls included are school size, school size squared, number of Roma in school, number of
Roma in school squared, percentage of Roma per class, class size, class size squared, female
(=1), age, age squared, and migrant (=1).
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Table 5: Intensity of treatment
Effect of programme in treatment year
all all female male
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dropouta
treatment*post -0.007 -0.001 0.009 -0.008
(0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.012)
intensive*treatment*post 0.008 0.001 0.044 -0.038
(0.025) (0.023) (0.044) (0.035)
No. observations 4167 4039 1951 2088
Absences
treatment*post -8.707 -4.089 1.886 -9.058
(7.720) (8.394) (8.324) (11.931)
intensive*treatment*post -19.312 -36.390 -9.522 -59.759**
( 27.119) (24.179) (36.096) (24.684)
No. observations 3980 3868 1871 1997
Serbianb
treatment*post -0.027 -0.058 -0.154* 0.041
(0.078) (0.080) (0.084) (0.094)
intensive*treatment*post 0.330* 0.307** 0.499** 0.108
(0.169) (0.150) (0.186) (0.151)
Mathematicsb
treatment*post -0.053 -0.078 -0.169 0.012
(0.081) (0.080) (0.093) (0.088)
intensive*treatment*post 0.454** 0.417** 0.680*** 0.161
(0.152) (0.143) (0.179) (0.138)
No. observations 4085 3961 1916 2045
Controlsc No Yes Yes Yes
School FE No Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the effect of the programme on dropouts, absences and Serbian
and mathematics. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school
level are reported in parentheses: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***
significant at 1%.
a Dropout is equal to 1 if child dropped out of school during the year; otherwise 0.
b Marks range from 1 (worst) to 5 (best). They are categorical.
c Controls included are school size, school size squared, percentage of Roma per
class, class size, class size squared, female (=1), age, age squared, migrant (=1),
and intensive (=1). Intensive is equal to 1 for schools with fewer than 43 Roma.
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Table 6: Intensity of treatment - Placebo
Placebo tests for pretreatment years
2006/2007 and 2007/2008 2007/2008 and 2008/2009
all female male all female male
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dropouta
intensive*treatment*post 0.010 0.056 -0.037 -0.014 -0.072 0.042
(0.016) (0.050) (0.039) (0.019) (0.040) (0.035)
No. observations 3640 1776 1864 3897 1897 2000
Absences
intensive*treatment*post 39.511 89.215 -11.344 -7.490 -40.031 25.702
(42.393) (60.105) (34.917) (26.991) (34.883) (25.084)
No. observations 3542 1732 1810 3788 1850 1938
Serbianb
intensive*treatment*post 0.002 -0.145 0.164 0.113 -0.039 0.240
(0.148) (0.190) (0.184) (0.163) (0.187) (0.207)
Mathematicsb
intensive*treatment*post 0.026 -0.150 0.199 -0.011 -0.135 0.100
(0.169) (0.208) (0.205) (0.133) (0.189) (0.159)
No. observations 3585 1750 1835 3846 1876 1970
Controlsc Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the results of the placebo regressions for pretreatment years for the intensity of treat-
ment approach. The outcomes of the regressions are dropouts, absences, Serbian and mathematics. Ro-
bust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school level are reported in parentheses: * significant
at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
a Dropout is equal to 1 if child dropped out of school during the year; otherwise 0.
b Marks range from 1 (worst) to 5 (best). They are categorical.
c Controls included are school size, school size squared, number of Roma in school, number of Roma in
school squared, percentage of Roma per class, class size, class size squared, female (=1), age, age squared,





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8: Cohort regression - Placebo
Placebo tests for pretreatment years
2006/2007 and 2007/2008 2007/2008 and 2008/2009
Early Late All Early Late All
Enrollees Enrollees Enrollees Enrollees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dropouta
young*post 0.003 0.008 0.011 -0.020 -0.036** -0.037***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013)
young*post*treatment -0.010 0.019
(0.024) (0.020)
No. observations 2259 1381 3640 2389 1508 3897
Absences
young*post -14.021 -56.385* -54.237* -9.425 -13.207 -13.596
(17.068) (27.822) (28.643) (13.600) (16.765) (18.055)
young*post*treatment 34.591 10.100
(32.454) (23.240)
No. observations 2203 1339 3542 2331 1457 3788
Serbianb
young*post 0.030 0.143 0.105 -0.167 0.034 0.043




young*post 0.164 0.117 0.086 -0.101 -0.115 -0.113
(0.237) (0.180) (0.185) (0.145) (0.197) (0.196)
young*post*treatment 0.122 -0.022
(0.286) (0.239)
No. observations 2232 1354 3586 2364 1482 3846
Controlsc Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the results of the placebo regressions for pretreatment years for cohort comparison method-
ology. The outcomes of the regressions are dropouts, absences, Serbian and mathematics. Robust standard
errors corrected for clustering at the school level are reported in parentheses: * significant at 10%, **
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
a Dropout is equal to 1 if child dropped out of school during the year; otherwise 0.
b Marks range from 1 (worst) to 5 (best). They are categorical.
c Controls included are school size, school size squared, number of Roma in school, number of Roma in school
squared, percentage of Roma per class, class size, class size squared, female (=1), age, age squared, migrant
(=1) and young (=1). Young is equal to 1 when the child is at the first grade.
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6 Figures
Figure 1: Location of the schools with assistants
This figure reports the distribution of schools in our sample. In pink munic-
ipalities there are only Early Enrollee school; in green municipalities there
are only Late Enrollee school and in dark blue municipalities there are both




A.1.1 Living conditions of Roma in Serbia
Data on Roma in Serbia are inaccurate and scarce. Surveys often lack infor-
mation about ethnic identity of the respondents. More importantly, when
asked about their ethnicity, some Roma people do not declare themselves as
Roma. Most of them consider themselves both Roma and Serbian and the
question of nationality allows only one answer.
The official 2002 census counts 108,000 Roma, while estimates put for-
ward a number between 350,000 and 500,000 or approximately 5-7% of the
overall population (Open Society Institute, 2007). Most Roma live in seg-
regated settlements and have different demographic characteristics from the
rest of the population. According to the World Bank Living Standard Mea-
surement Survey (LSMS) 2003 - which provides a boosted sample of Roma
in Serbia - their households are more numerous than the average household,
they have more children and their population is younger. The percentage of
male Roma who declare to have worked over the last week is similar to the
national average (69%). Contrary to men, the participation of females is
34% and considerably lower than the national average (53%). Overall, ap-
proximately 60% of Roma have a consumption below the poverty line and
weekly consumption of food per household member in Roma households is
half the national average.
Turning to education, 60% of Roma younger than 18 years old have not
completed primary education. In contrast, only 20% of overall population
do not have a primary school diploma. Out of all children of primary school-
age, 30% of Roma do not attend school whereas this is the case for only 1% of
the overall population of primary school-age. Using data from the National
Assessment Study conducted with third grade students, Baucal (2009) finds
that after the first 3 years of school Roma pupils lag 2.2 - 2.5 years behind
the average student. Also, children from Roma ethnic minority performed
worse on standardised tests than Non Roma children with the same socio-
economic background.
The main barriers of access to education for Roma are absence of doc-
uments, financial constraints, parents’ low educational background, child
labour, discrimination from teachers and pupils and language barriers (Open
Society Institute, 2008). In the recent years Serbian schools started enrolling
children with incomplete documents, but there is still a minor number of
children not able to enrol due to lack of documents. According to the law,
the local government should inform schools and parents that children who
reach the school-age in the municipality have to enrol at school. But Roma
are often not regularly registered as residents in the municipality and the
local government is not able to reach out to them. School books and addi-
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tional school material are a significant burden for the budget of poor families
and the most poor among Roma children do not even own adequate clothing
for winter months and live in overcrowded homes where they do not have
adequate conditions to pursue their studies. A majority of Roma parents
has low educational attainment and this implies that they often cannot help
their children with their school work. In addition, some parents attach little
value to schooling and education. These reasons together imply that the
perceived benefits of going to school are lower than respective costs. More-
over, in some cases Roma children help their parents in their work. Also,
Roma pupils can face discrimination from teachers and other pupils. There
is anecdotal evidence that they are often seated in the last row in classrooms,
that teachers do not read their homework and that teachers do not encour-
age them in their studies. Another problematic issue is that a considerable
share of them is sent to special schools. Finally, in a survey conducted by
UNICEF - Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey, 2006 - only 10% of Roma de-
clare Serbian to be their mother tongue. Children may face difficulties at
school due to limited knowledge of Serbian.34
A.1.2 Primary Education System in Serbia
In Serbia, school is compulsory until age 15. Children enrol at primary
school if they are aged at least 6.5 years at the start of the scholastic year
in September. Since 2007 the attendance of at least 6 months of a cost-free
preschool programme is compulsory; in 2010 the length of the compulsory
preschool has been extended to 9 months.35
Primary school consists of 8 years. In the first four grades pupils get
one teacher who teaches all compulsory subjects except English, while in
the upper four years pupils have one teacher per subject. In the first grade
teachers use descriptive marks; from the second grade on, the range of marks
is 1 to 5 with 1 being the insufficient and worst mark. The marks are
categorical. During each semester, a child gets 4 marks for each subject.
Out of the 4 marks, at least 2 marks are derived from written tests. The
teacher can decide what to use as assessment for the remaining two marks.
He could give additional written tests, give marks based on oral examination,
homework or class participation. The final mark at the end of the year is
the arithmetic mean of 8 marks. If a pupil gets at least one insufficient mark
at the end of the year, her teacher can decide whether to let her pass to the
upper grade or to ask her to take the retake exam in August. In the last few
34With few exceptions, the rest declare Romani to be their mother tongue.
35The obligatory preschool programme has been introduced in order to facilitate the
transition to school for children from lower socio-economic backgrounds. In the initial
years the capacities of preschool institutions were not sufficient to enrol all preschool
children. Hence, some children, mainly from poorer families or in rural areas, could not
be enrolled in preschool. However, due to the lack in the enforcement of the law, they were
let to enrol in school also without having attended the compulsory preschool programme.
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years the Ministry of Education has suggested that schools reduce repetition
rates, especially in the lower four grades.
There are no school fees for primary school, but indirect costs such as
books and other school material can pose a considerable cost for some par-
ents.36 The Ministry of Education aims at reducing the cost of education
and the first graders in 2009/2010 are the first generation to receive free text
books. The plan is that this generation and all younger generations obtain
free school books in the future.
A.2 Sensitivity analysis of the threshold of intensity of treat-
ment
In the main body of this paper, we examine how the effect of the programme
varies based on the number of Roma in a school. We split the schools in two
equally sized groups based on the number of Roma in the school. We define
a dummy ‘intensive’ which takes value 1 if a school is among schools with
less Roma (at most 43 Roma children), and value 0 if a school is among
schools with more Roma (more than 43 Roma children). In this section we
report how our results change when we vary this threshold.
Table 9 shows the results of the intensity of treatment approach for
different thresholds. We rank the schools based on the number of Roma,
starting with the lowest, and divide then the schools in 10 deciles. Column
(1) of the table reports the results if we set the dummy ‘intensive’ equal
to 1 for schools in the first decile and 0 otherwise. In column (2) we set
the dummy ‘intensive’ equal to 1 for schools in the first and second decile,
and 0 otherwise, etc. The reported coefficient (intensive*treatment*post)
captures the effect of the programme on treated children in schools where
the programme is ‘intensive’. Essentially, going from the left to the right
columns we increase the number of schools and thus the number children for
which we consider the programme to be ‘intensive’. For instance, in column
(1) children in schools with less than 16 Roma are considered to be treated.
In column (2) this number rises to 23 Roma per school, etc. We expect that
the effect of the programme drops as we go from left to the right columns
and this is exactly what this table shows. The results in table 9 are only
indicative and should be interepreted with caution especially for the lower
deciles. For lower deciles we consider only very few schools to be actually
treated (in the case of column (1) only one treated school falls into the first
decile).
36On average, in Serbia costs associated with school (books and other school material)
correspond to almost 2% of yearly household income (LSMS 2003). Based on a survey












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A.3 Cost of the programme
This section aims to give an estimate of the cost of the programme and to
contrast this programme to alternative interventions available to the gov-
ernment. At this early stage of the programme it is not possible to pro-
vide an estimate of the monetary benefits. Still, we discuss two possible
channels through which this programme could affect future labour market
outcomes and thus, could have a monetary gain. First, the programme
could raise completion rates of primary school and consequently, the aver-
age educational attainment of treated Roma children. Higher educational
attainment implies higher earnings (Angrist and Krueger, 1991). We do
not find that dropout rates fall, because in the lower 4 grades of primary
school the dropout rates are already low. Primary school lasts 8 years and
we believe that dropout rates in the higher grade (from 5th to 8th) are the
ones actually affected by the programme. A second channel through which
the programme could affect children’s labour market outcomes is through
better grades. Several studies (Murnane, Willett, and Levy, 1995; Neal
and Johnson, 1996; Currie and Thomas, 1999) have demonstrated a posi-
tive relationship between pupils’ test scores at school and their subsequent
earnings.
The main cost of the programme are the (gross) wages of the assistants
which amount to 450 Euros per month. In addition to that, in 2009/2010,
assistants attended 7 trainings totalling up to 22 days. Our estimation
suggests that the training per assistant had a cost of approximately 1,200
Euros.37 The turnover of the assistants in the first year was very low with
only two people quitting in that period. This is especially important because
it indicates that training costs will not be bore each year. Not taking into
account the training costs, we calculate that the programme costed 100
Euros per Roma student per year.38 We know that in Belgrade 53% of Roma
children were actually treated (Battaglia and Lebedinski, 2013), assuming
that the take up rate was the same also in the whole of Serbia, this yields a
cost of 200 Euros per treated child.
There are no cost estimates of other programmes in Serbia to which this
programme could be directly compared. We still discuss two other mea-
sures which we consider alternatives to the RTA programme. One possible
37We calculate the cost for accommodation and stay during the training to be 40 Euros
per day plus transport costs of 10 Euros for 7 travels. This amounts to 950 Euros. There
were 22 days of training and we add additional 14 days for preparation of training and
reporting. The cost of trainers is 150 Euros per day and the wage cost is 5,400 Euros.
Accommodation, stay and travel costs of trainers are 1,510 Euros (22 days*40 Euros
+ 7 travels *10 Euros). Therefore, the total costs for trainers including their stay and
accommodation is 6,910. Dividing this sum with 26 (number of assistants) gives 265
Euros per assistant. The cost of accommodation per assistant (950 Euros) plus training
per assistant (265 Euros) adds up to a total cost of the training of 1,215 Euros.
38450 Euros *12 month [wages]* 23 schools /1268 Roma students = 97,95 Euros.
35
alternative would be to use professional teachers to give remedial education
classes. The gross wage of teachers is in the range of 900 to 1,200 Euros
depending on the experience and thus twice the amount paid to the assis-
tants. Assuming that two assistants have at least the same performance as
one teacher, the RTA programme is more cost effective. Aside from being
less costly, an additional advantage of RTAs is that they act as role models
for Roma children and this cannot be easily quantified in monetary terms.
A second option available to the policy maker would be class size reduc-
tion, but this intervention did not yield satisfactory results in some settings
(Hoxby, 2000) and is a very costly intervention. Another disadvantage of
the class size reduction is that it does not specifically target disadvantaged
children.
All of these facts, taken together, indicate that the programme is with
200 Euros per child per year not overly costly and that it also performs well
with respect to its alternatives.
A.4 Spillover effects - Non Roma pupils
We can investigate whether this programme also affects Non Roma pupils.
We employ both econometric strategies and their combination and find that
neither absences reduced nor marks improved for Non Roma students. The
presence of a Roma assistant do not improve Non Roma schooling outcomes.
Results are reported in tables 11 and 12.
These results, combined together with the previous ones, provide some
evidence that the programme is succeeding in reducing the gap between
Roma and Non Roma children, both in school achievements and attendance.
36
Table 11: Average treatment approach - Non Roma




post 5.025*** -0.011 0.011
(1.185) (0.031) (0.018)
treatment*post -1.586 0.054 0.029
(1.725) (0.034) (0.025)
No. observations 14686 14982 14981
Controlsb Yes Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the effect of the programme on Non Roma for
absences, Serbian and mathematics. Robust standard errors cor-
rected for clustering at the school level are reported in parentheses:
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
a Marks range from 1 (worst) to 5 (best). They are categorical.
b Controls included are school size, school size squared, number of
Roma in school, number of Roma in school squared, percentage of
Roma per class, class size, class size squared, female (=1), age, age
squared, and migrant (=1).
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